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CONNECTICUT LAW-DRAM SHOPS: THIRD-PARTY RECOVERY
FOR RECKLESS AND WANTON MISCONDUCT-Kowal v. HoJher, 42
Conn. L.J. No.1, 17 (1980).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On November 6, 1977 Delbert Goff drove his car across the
center lane of a Connecticut highway and collided with a car
driven by James Kowal. As a result of the accident Kowal suffered
extensive injuries and died. Plaintiff, administrator of Kowal's es
tate, brought an action against the owners and employees of the
Hutch Restaurant, alleging that Goff had been served liquor by de
fendants while he was intoxicated. 1 The complaint further alleged
that Goff left the premises while intoxicated, returned, was served
again while intoxicated, left a second time, and caused the colli
sion.
The first count of plaintiff's claim was brought under the
Connecticut Dram Shop Act;2 the second count was based on
common-law negligence; and the third count was based on the
common-law tort of gross negligen~e, which includes the element
of reckless and wanton misconduct. 3 Before the facts in dispute
were litigated, 4 two legal issues were appealed to the Connecticut
Supreme Court. The court's decision in Kowal v. HoJherS was lim
ited to a determination of whether the two common-law actions ex
isted under Connecticut law.
Although the court reasserted the rule that actions for ordinary
negligence and gross negligence do not exist, it held that a
1. Brief for Appellant at 3, Kowal v. Hollier, 42 Conn. L.J. No.1, at 17 (1980).
2. The statute provides in part:
[ilf any person, by himself or his agent, sells any alcoholic-liquor to an intoxi
cated person, and such purchaser, in consequence of such intoxication, there
after injures the person or property of another, such seller shall pay just
damages to the person injured, up to the amount of twenty thousand dollars,
or to persons injured in consequence of such intoxication up to an aggregate
amount of fifty thousand dollars, to be recovered in an action under this sec
tion....
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-102 (1979).
3. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 18 n.3. The court in Kowal confined its ruling to the
allegations of reckless and wanton misconduct.
4. At the time of publication of this note the trial was still pending.
5. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1, at 17 (1980).
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common-law remedy based on reckless and wanton misconduct
may be asserted by a third party against a liquor vendor.6 Kowal
reversed the longstanding, common-law rule that no tort action
could be brought by an injured third party against a liquor
vendor.7 Liquor vendors previously were immune from these tort
suits because legal causation could not be proved; the customer's
consumption of liquor, not the vendor's sale, was treated as the
proximate cause of the intoxication. 8 The Kowal court for the first
time traced the chain of causation from the third party's injury
back to the liquor vendor's sale of alcohol. In recognizing a com
mon-law cause of action the court implicitly reached the conclu
sion that the Dram Shop Act is not the exclusive remedy when
drunk drivers cause accidents. 9
Kowal may have a far-reaching effect on liquor vendor liabil
ity. This note offers third-party claimants some arguments to pur
sue in seeking a remedy. Further, it will show that Kowal's nebu
lous language invites attorneys to distort facts constituting ordinary
negligence to fit Kowal's reckless misconduct theory. Finally, this
note will show that liability for reckless misconduct creates the po
tential for conflicting duties on the part of liquor vendors.

II.

HISTORY OF COMMON-LAW ACTIONS IN RELATION TO

DRAM SHOP ACT
During the last twenty-five years the Connecticut Supreme
Court has had several occasions to consider the relation between
the common law and the Dram Shop Act. In London and
Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Duryea 10 the court suggested that
the Dram Shop Act was the exclusive remedy available to in
jured third parties against liquor vendors when it said that de
fendant's liability came into being only by virtue of the Act. l l
Two years later12 the court declared that the Dram Shop Act cre
ated an action unknown to the common law. 13 In 1967 Nolan v.
THE

6.
7.
Galick,
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 19.
Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436, 226 A.2d 383, 386 (1967); Noonan v.
19 Conn. Supp. 308, 310, 112 A.2d 892, 894 (1955).
Id.
See note 61 infra.
143 Conn. 53, 119 A.2d 325 (1955).
11. [d. at 60, 119 A.2d at 328.
12. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355
U.S. 15 (1957).
13. [d. at 249, 129 A.2d at 612. Pierce created an evidentiary shortcut. A
high level of intoxication at the time of the crash is sufficient to create a reason
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Morelli 14 further distinguished the Act from the common law when
the court stated that the common law, which completely denied
third-party recovery, was overly harsh and that the Dram Shop Act
was created to modify it. 15 The court nonetheless repeated the
common-law rule by saying that no tort cause of action lay against
a liquor vendor.1s By recognizing that no tort cause of action lay
against a liquor vendor, the court appeared to foreclose even an
action for reckless and wanton misconduct.
More recently, in Nelson v. Steffens,17 the court reaffirmed its
position that third-party, common-law remedies against liquor ven
dors do not exist in Connecticut. In Nelson plaintiffs brought a
common-law negligence action alleging that the liquor vendor had
violated a state law. 18 In denying the action the court said that
plaintiffs had not advanced a compelling reason for abrogation of
the common law. 19 When plaintiffs complained that the Dram
Shop Act ceiling of recovery was too low, the court responded that,
if the damage limitation was too low, it should be increased by leg
islative enactment rather than by overturning established judicial
principles. 20
The most significant language in Nelson appears in the dissent.
Justice Joseph Bogdanski, in a five-page dissenting opinion, urged
the court to adopt a common-law cause of action for ordinary negli
gence. Justice Bogdanski asserted that a jury should decide
whether a liquor vendor has breached his common-law duty of or
dinary care in serving alcohol to an intoxicated person. 21 He rea

able inference that the driver must have been intoxicated when he was served the
last drink by the defendant liquor vendor. Id. at 259, 129 A.2d at 616.
14. 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967). In a footnote, the court reserved judg
ment on the issue of whether the Dram Shop Act was the exclusive remedy. Id. at
439 n.2, 226 A.2d at 387 n.2. In the same footnote, the court expressly acknowledged
that a common-law cause of action still might exist. "But if, under any circumstances,
any alternative common-law right against a seller, as such, exists, it would, to the ex
tent that it exists, necessarily permit the avoidance, through use of a common-law ac
tion, of the provision of the Act restricting the amount of damages recoverable ...."
Id.
15. Id. at 437, 226 A.2d at 386.
16. Id. at 436, 226 A.2d at 386.
17. 170 Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976).
18. The complaint alleged that defendant liquor vendor knowingly had sold
liquor to a minor who intended to drive from defendant's establishment. Id. at
357-58,365 A.2d at 1175.
19. Id. at 361, 365 A.2d at 1177.
20. Id.
21. Id. (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
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soned that Connecticut's criminal statute22 measured the duty
owed by a liquor vendor to the general public2 3 and that violation
of the statute constituted negligence per se. Justice Bogdanski
satisfied the proximate cause element by theorizing that consump
tion was not the causative factor but merely a foreseeable
intervening cause. 24 Justice Bogdanski's dissent later influenced the
Kowal majority to fashion a common-law theory of recovery for in
jured third parties.
Most recently, in Slicer v. Quigley,25 the Connecticut Su
preme Court approved a lower court's jury instruction that· no
common-law cause of action existed. The court acknowledged that
common-law causes of action had been adopted in a substantial
numher of jurisdictions but nevertheless adhered to Nelson. 26 In
another five-page dissent Justice Bogdanski urged the court to cre
ate a common-law remedy.27 A second dissent was reported in the
Slicer opinion. Associate Justice Ellen Peters also advocated a
cause of action for negligence based on violation of a statute. 28
Prior to Kowal no third-party, common-law cause of action
22. The criminal statute provides:
[a]ny permittee who, by himself, his servant or agent, sells or delivers alco
holic liquor to any minor, or to any intoxicated person, or to any habitual
drunkard, knowing him to be such an habitual drunkard, and any person, ex
cept the parent or guardian of a minor, who delivers or gives any such liq
uors to such minor, except on the order of a practicing physician, shall be
subject to the penalties of section 30-113.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86 (1979). Section 30-113 further states: "Penalties. Any per
son convicted of a violation of any provision of this chapter, for which a specified
penalty is not imposed shall, for each offense, be fined not more than one thousand
dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." [d. (emphasis in original).
23. 170 Conn. at 362, 365 A.2d at 1177.
24.' [d. at 363-66, 365 A.2d at 1177-79. The dissent directly quotes the RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1966):
[t]he fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is
done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to
another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should
have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man know
ing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would
not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c)
the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the ac
tor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negli
gent.
170 Conn. at 363-64, 365 A.2d at 1178.
25. 41 Conn. L.J. No. 42 at 1 (1980).
26. [d. at 3.
27. [d. at 8 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
28. [d. (Peters, J., dissenting).
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against liquor vendors existed in Connecticut. The dissents in Nel
son and Slicer, however, demonstrate that a momentum for change
had begun prior to Kowal. Although Kowal did not recognize an
action for ordinary negligence, as urged by the Slicer dissents, it
did create a common-law action for reckless misconduct. Why the
court did not go one step further and create an ordinary negligence
action is uncertain. The following analysis offers one possible expla
nation for the court's reservation. It also exposes some complica
tions that have resulted from the court's distinction between negli
gent misconduct and reckless misconduct.
III.

ANALYSIS

In Kowal the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the
longstanding judicial rule that the Dram Shop Act is the exclusive
source of relief for third parties against liquor vendors. The Kowal
court simply declared that the legislature did not intend the Dram
Shop Act to be the exclusive remedy if causation could ,be traced
back adequately to the liquor vendor.29 Undefined policy consider
ations were then used to transform the sale into proximate cause. 30
The most significant aspect of the case is the distinction it
drew between ordinary negligence and the more aggravated form
of negligence, reckless and wanton misconduct. The court said that
greater consequences attach when conduct is reckless rather than
merely negligent. 31 The court may have feared that foreseeability
of an intervening cause, the standard governing liability in ordinary
negligence cases,32 would be too easy to prove because any care
less act by an intoxicated driver is foreseeable. Unreasonable third
party claims against liquor vendors would have a greater chance of
succeeding under an ordinary negligence standard. To avoid impos
ing excessive liability on liquor vendors, the court held that
common-law liability will attach only when a liquor vendor engages
in reckless and wanton misconduct, defined as outrageous con
duct. 33 When the liquor vendor's conduct is outrageous, nebulous
29. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 18.
30. Id. See note 67 infra and accompanying text.
3l. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 18.
32. An intervening cause is one that individuals should reasonably anticipate
due to ordinary human experience. A defendant is liable for negligence if he per
forms some act that results in injury when some foreseeable intervening cause com
bines with the defendant's act to cause injury. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 44, at 272 (4th ed. 1971).
33. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 19.
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policy considerations satisfy the proximate cause requirement.
Thus, under Kowal, an ordinary negligence action fails because the
consumption, not the sale, is the proximate cause; yet a reckless
misconduct action succeeds because policy establishes causation.
Because the Kowal court did not explain what types of policy
considerations affect causation, the limits of the newly created
common-law remedy remain speculative. Until the court defines
"reckless and wanton misconduct" and applies it to a set of facts
involving a liquor vendor and third-party injury, potential com
mon-law liability will remain uncertain. Since Kowal did not de
scribe the type of conduct that will be regarded as reckless and
wanton, a definition must be sought in existing case law. In the
paragraphs below this note will examine reckless misconduct prin
ciples that, until Kowal, have been unrelated to liquor vendors.
A.

Reckless Misconduct

Reckless and wanton misconduct is more aggravated than ordi
nary negligence. 34 The reckless actor is consciously indifferent to
the consequences of his action and almost demonstrates a willing
ness to have disastrous consequences flow from his actions. 35 Since
such a state of mind usually cannot be proved, an objective stan
dard has been applied. To be liable, the reckless actor needs only
to have disregarded "a high degree of danger, either known to him
or apparent to a reasonable ... [person] in his position. "36
Reckless misconduct is an aggravated form of negligent con
duct that commonly is discussed in automobile guest act cases or in
contributory negligence cases. The Connecticut Supreme Court has
determined that a defendant may be charged with reckless miscon
duct when he is in reckless disregard of the rights of others. He
must show an indifference to the consequences of his action; mo
mentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or erroneous judgment is
not sufficient to constitute recklessness. 37 For example, in Upson
v. General Baking CO.38 defendant engaged in reckless misconduct
by disregarding a warning. 39 Defendant ignored his passenger's
34.. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 34, at 184.
35. Id. at 185.
36. Id.
37. Ascher v. H.E. Friedman, Inc., 110 Conn. 1,4, 147 A. 263, 264 (1929).
38. 113 Conn. 787, 156 A. 858 (1931).
39. Id. at 788, 156 A. at 859. See also Riordan v. Gouin, 119 Conn. 235, 236-37,
175 A. 686, 687 (1934); Anderson v. Collucci, 116 Conn. 67, 73, 163 A. 610, 612
(1932). Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn. 169, 170, 147 A. 568 (1929).
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warning about the risk of passing on the left, caused an accident,
and was liable for the resulting injuries. In Grasser v. Fleming, 40
cited as support in Kowal,41 decedent's wife warned the bartender
that her husband could not control his appetite for liquor. The bar
tender agreed not to serve decedent but nevertheless sold him an
excessive amount of liquor. While walking home, decedent slipped
off a narrow bridge and died. 42 The Michigan Court of Appeals
held that the conduct supported an action for wanton miscon
duct. 43
The Connecticut Supreme Court has not defined reckless and
wanton misconduct clearly, nor has the court ruled that disre
garding a warning is a necessary element of reckless misconduct.
Failure to heed a warning, however, recurs in the case law as evi
dence of recklessness. 44 In Ziman v. Whitley 45 the court found
reckless misconduct even in the absence of an express warning.
Evidence that defendant had disregarded an imminent danger by
driving his car at an unsafe speed through an intersection appar
ently convinced the jury46 that the actor's conduct had been reck
less. 47 Since there is no specific requirement that an actual warn
ing must be disregarded before liability will be found, perhaps
disregard of a constructive warning will suffice to create liability.
Connecticut case law does not directly embrace the notion of
constructive warning, but elements present in the cases are ready
to be used in support of a constructive warning principle. It is well
established that disregard of an express warning is evidence of
recklessness. 48 Ziman, however, did not require an express warn
ing because the clear presence of an imminent danger was tanta
mount to a warning. Under a broad reading of Ziman, therefore,
40. 74 Mich. App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757 (1977).
41. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 19.
42. 74 Mich. App. at 340,253 N.W.2d at 758.
43. [d. at 350, 253 N.W.2d at 763.
44. See notes 38 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
45. 110 Conn. 108, 147 A. 370 (1929).
46. [d. at 1l0-12, 147 A. at 372. The jury decides whether conduct is reckless
and wanton. Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79,83, 14 A.2d 713, 715 (1940). The jury's
decision cannot be set aside "unless its manifest injustice is 'so plain and palpable as
to justify the suspicion that the jury or some of its members were influenced by prej
udice, corruption or partiality.' " Coner v. Chittenden, 116 Conn. 78, 82, 163 A. 472,
473 (1932) (quoting Roma v. Thames River Specialities Co., 90 Conn. 18, 19, 96 A.
169, 169 (1915)). See also Riordan v. Gouin, 119 Conn. 235, 237-38, 175 A. 686, 687
(1934).
47. 110 Conn. at 110-12, 147 A. at 372.
48. See notes 39 & 40 supra and accompanying text.

776

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:769

disregard of a constructive warning could constitute recklessness.
The following discussion of constructive warnings should be read
with Ziman in mind.

B.

Constructive Warning

Even if he had not been warned expressly by decedent's wife,
defendant bartender in Grasser still might have been found liable
simply because he knew that decedent was an alcoholic. Mere
knowledge that decedent was an alcoholic might have constituted a
warning. In Nally v. Blandford,49 also cited in Kowal,50 there is no
indication that defendant had been warned directly of risk. The
Kentucky court simply held that defendant knew or should have
known that the sale of a quart of whiskey, which defendant knew
decedent was going to consume at once, would cause injury.
Plaintiff's husband died from alcohol poisoning. The court used a
foreseeability standard51 to measure defendant's duty. The bar
tender was charged with knowledge that injury would result be
cause the injury could reasonably have been foreseen. Disregard of
the likelihood of injury, in this instance, is equivalent to disregard
of an express warning that injury is likely.
When foreseeability of injury operates as a constructive warn
ing, knowledge that a customer later will drive a car could operate
as a constructive warning. If a customer demonstrates that he is in
toxicated, the bartender should be put on notice that the customer
will drive dangerously. Hazardous weather conditions could serve
as constructive warning to a bartender that his customers might be
come dangerous drivers. Knowledge of excessive drinking during
"happy hours"52 could operate as a constructive warning. Juries
might be willing to find liquor vendors liable for this indifferent
conduct in light of the pervasive use of the automobile and the
high percentage of alcohol-related accidents. 53
49. 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
50. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 19.
51. 291 S.W.2d at 835.
52. "Happy hours" are designed to lure customers into bars during limited
hours when prices are lowered.
53. See GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP., THE DRINKING-DRIVER PROB
LEM-WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT? (Feb. 1979). The Slicer dissent, 41 Conn.
L.J. No. 42 at 6, quotes directly from the GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP., supra, at
iv.: "The Government Accounting Office found that among the major obstacles to
successful anti-drinking-driver efforts were: 'Social acceptability and use of alcohol. .
. . Need for increased judicial support. ... Need for effective methods to identify
and penalize those who serve intoxicated individuals.' " 41 Conn. L.J. No. 42 at 6
(emphasis added by court).
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In Kowal, Goff allegedly was served, left the premises, re
turned, and was served again. The clear implication that Goff was
going to drive a car could have constituted a constructive warning.
When defendants served Goff the second time, they disregarded a
constructive warning that Goff was a danger to the public.
Kowal, however, indicates that reckless and wanton miscon
duct is closer to intentional conduct than it is to negligent con
duct. 54 Kowal did not address the state of mind of defendant liquor
vendor. The courts presumably will draw upon the existing ca.ses
that have dealt with the mental state of a reckless defendant. Dis
regard of imminent danger has been used as a ground to establish
recklessness, but its role in the context of liquor sales is pure
ly speculative. The following section examines the conduct and
mental state that will warrant a finding of reckless and wanton mis
conduct.

C.

Requisite Mental State

In 1935 the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that an
actor may be liable for reckless misconduct if he is able· to foresee
the possibility of harm. In Rogers v. Dood y 55 the court stated that
an actor may be found liable for reckless misconduct even if he
does not intend to cause harm. The actor will be found liable if he
realized or should have realized that his actions created a Sb-ong
probability that harm might result. 56 This is the same approach
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement).57 Un
der this reasoning, conduct will be deemed reckless when the per
son doing the act is aware of the possibility that harm will result.
Using the Rogers and the Restatement rationale, a bartender may
be liable for reckless misconduct even if he expected no harm to
result. This argument gains strength from Ziman. There the reck
less actor was liable for speeding through an intersection. The con
duct was deemed reckless because the risk of injury was a strong
possibility.
Connecticut case law and the Restatement are unclear on the
degree to which the actor must anticipate harm. It is firmly estab
54.
55.

42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 19.
119 Conn. 532, 178 A. 51 (1935).
56. ld. at 535, 178 A. at 53. This language was taken directly from the RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS supra note 21, § 500, comment f, at 590. In the
RESTATEMENT, id. this language is immediately followed by the words: "even
though he hopes or even expects that this conduct will prove harmless." ld.
57. ld. § 500, at 590.
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lished in Connecticut case law, however, that the jury decides
whether conduct is reckless. 58 If a jury is left to decide the ques
tion, it could assume that bartenders are always reckless when they
serve intoxicated customers because an intoxicated driver creates a
risk to the public that is imminent and easily foreseeable. The
complex issue of causation might render the common law useless to
the jury. A jury, therefore, might find liquor vendors liable for
reckless and wanton misconduct when they were, at worst, careless
or negligent. Liability could be found without intentional or even
outrageous conduct.
Expanded liability also may result because reckless misconduct
is determined by the use of an objective test. 59 An objective test
will not require the bartender to be indifferent to the safety of
travelers; rather, carelessness may suffice. 60 Only further develop
ment of the case law will reveal what consequences bartenders
should anticipate.
IV.

A.

IMPACT OF KOWAL

Ordinary Negligence

The Connecticut Supreme Court has taken a significant step in
creating a common-law cause of action against liquor vendors for
reckless and wanton misconduct. Recognition of an ordinary negli
gence action is the next logical step. As a result of Kowal, the argu
ment that the Dram Shop Act was intended to occupy the field is
no longer an obstacle to an ordinary negligence action. 61 Further,
when the court held that the Dram Shop Act was not the exclusive
remedy in its search to find a common-law remedy,62 it supported
58. Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79,83, 14 A.2d 713, 715 (1940).
59. In Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698 (1928), the court
stated, "[iln the instant case the jury might have found that the defendant, knowing,
or bound with knowledge because by a reasonable use of his faculties he should
have observed, that the trolley was about to stop...." Id. at 200, 139 A. at 699. See
also Rogers v. Doody, 119 Conn. 532, 555, 178 A. 51, 53 (1935).
60. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
61. 42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 18. "There is absolutely no indication, however, that
where causation is adequately traced back to the bar keeper ... the legislature nev
ertheless, intended the dram shop act to be the injured plaintiff's exclusive remedy."
Id.
The dissent in Kowal countered the majority's position by stating that "[tlhe ma
jority of jurisdictions with dram shop acts which have addressed this issue hold that
where the act applies, the remedies provided by the legislature are exclusive be
cause the legislature has preempted additional common-law remedies." Id. at 20.
62. Id. at 18. The court quoted the RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, on this point:

19811
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the holding by citing Berkeley v. Park 63 and Mason v. Roberts, 64
which "both created causes of action for ordinary negligence in ju
risdictions having Dram Shop Acts. In these cases the liquor vend
or's duty was measured by a criminal statute that protected the
general public. 65 The Kowal court created a common-law cause of
action for reckless and wanton misconduct, yet Berkeley and Mason
created actions for ordinary negligence.
The underlying principles of ordinary negligence and reckless
and wanton misconduct seemingly overlap because they both use
an objective test and both require that harm be foreseeable. Given
this similarity, the Connecticut Supreme Court may be moving in
a direction similar to that taken in neighboring jurisdictions and
soon may recognize ordinary negligence actions. The two dissents
in Slicer66 demonstrate that the Connecticut Supreme Court is not
unanimous concerning the status of a common-law ordinary negli
gence action. The dissenters may yet influence the majority's view.
The court determined that the causation element could be
satisfied by "policy considerations. "57 Additionally, the court re
served the freedom to shape policy considerations by using a
"moral approach to causation. "68 The Connecticut Supreme Court's
policy concerning ordinary negligence liability for liquor vendors,
therefore, might be influenced by an argument based on moral
considerations because "a moral approach to causation introduces
into the formula the perceived nature of the actor's conduct which
produced the injury. Responsibility for greater consequences may

"Lt1he fact that the actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's safety
rather than merely negligent is a matter to be taken into account in determining
whether a jury may reasonably find that the actor's conduct bears a sufficient causal
relation to another's harm to make the actor liable therefor." Id. at 501(2), at 591; cf.
id. § 435B, at 455.
63. 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965).
64. 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
65. This was Justice Bogdanski's approach in Slicer v. Quigley, 41 Conn. L.J.
No. 42 at 6. See notes 21 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
67. 42 Conn. L.J. No. 1 at 18. At common law, the consumption, but not the
sale, was the proximate cause of injury. Policy considerations, according to the
Kowal court, can make the sale the proximate cause: "[i1n sum whatever the formu
lation of the rule, policy considerations generally underlie the doctrine of proximate
cause." [d.
68. Id. at 18. "A moral approach to causation introduces into the formula the
perceived nature of the actor's conduct which produced the injury. Responsibility for
greater consequences may be considered justified in the case of intentional or reck
less conduct than for mere negligence." [d.

I
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be considered justified in the case of intentional or reckless con
duct than for mere negligence. "69 The Slicer dissents confinn that
two justices will be willing to listen to arguments based on moral
. principles favoring an ordinary negligence action.
In several states the defense of lack of causation, the common
law defense to an ordinary negligence action, has deteriorated. Ju
risdictions that have created ordinary negligence actions have rec
ognized that the law must keep pace with the changes that have
taken place in society. Liability is recognized as a flexible concept
that evolves with social values. Many jurisdictions, therefore, have
broadened the concept of causation to ease the plaintiffs burden of
proof.
The New York Court of Appeals asserted in Berkeley that,
while danger to the general public from transportation was not
imminent in the horse and buggy era, it is imminent today be
cause the mode of travel has changed. 70 The court quoted Judge
Cardozo:
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not
fit the conditions of travel to-day. The principle that the danger
must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the
principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a de
veloping civilization require them to be.71

The Berkeley court changed the concept of causation' because
the increased use of the automobile made the drunk driver's threat
to the public easily foreseeable. Thus, the court fashioned a
foreseeability standard as the measure of the duty owed by liquor
vendors to the public because the risk of selling alcohol to an al
ready intoxicated person who drives an automobile is easily
foreseeable to the reasonable person. 72
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Rappaport v. Nichols 73
held that policy considerations and the balancing of conflicting in
terests are factors in shaping the common-law principles of negli
gence and proximate cause. 74 Disregard of a foreseeable risk of
hann was held to constitute negligence. Further, the court decided

69. [d.
70. 47 Misc. 2d at 383-84,262 N,Y,S,2d at 293.
71. 47 Mise, 2d at 384, 262 N,Y,S.2d at 293. (quoting MacPherson v, Buick Mo
tor Co" 217 N.Y. 382, 391, HI N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.)).
72. Id, at 383,262 N.Y,S,2d at 293.
73. 31 N,J, 188, 156 A,2d 1 (1959).
74. Id, at 197, 156 A,2d at 10,
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that negligence might be found when a defendant disregards un
reasonable risk resulting from the predictable action of another. 75
In Rappaport the intoxicated minor drove carelessly and caused
an accident which resulted in the death of plaintiff's decedent,
Rappaport. The liquor vendor who had served the minor was liable
to Rappaport's administratrix.
In Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 76 a Massachusetts criminal
statute measured the duty owed by a liquor vendor to the general
public. Violation of the statute was evidence of negligence. 77 The
liquor vendor, who catered to the driving public,78 allegedly
served an intoxicated customer. In devising a remedy for the inno
cent victims of an ensuing automobile accident, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court said: "waste of human life due to drunken
driving on the highways will not be left outside the scope of the
foreseeable risk created by the sale of liquor to an already intoxi
· di VI'dual . "79
cae
t d III
Twenty-four jurisdictions have adopted ordinary negligence ac
tions and have held that the sale of liquor can cause injury to third
parties. 8o The modem view is toward expansion of negligence lia
bility in the area of dram shops.81 Most of the jurisdictions that
have created tort actions have founded liability on ordinary negli
gence standards,82 and they consider violation of an applicable stat
ute to be evidence of negligence. If the Connecticut Supreme
Court is determined to resist any further changes in the area of liq
uor vendor liability despite the changes occurring in other jurisdic
tions,83 proponents might try the following approach to establish li
ability.
75. Id. at 194, 156 A.2d at 8.
76. 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968).
77. Negligence per se based on a statutory violation operates in Connecticut.
See Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256 A.2d 246 (1969). In Panaroni, a landlord
was liable to his tenant for injuries sustained by the tenant when he fell down an
unsafe exterior stairway. The applicable statute required the landlord to keep exte
rior stairways in safe repair.
78. 353 Mass. at 499, 233 N.E.2d at 19. Defendant's tavern was on a public
road and had a large parking lot.
79. Id. at 501, 233 N.E.2d at 20.
80. Brief for Appellant at 6, Kowal v. Hofher,42 Conn. L.J. No.1 at 17.
81. Id. at 5.
82. See note 83 infra.
83. Trail v. Christian, 213 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1973); Veseley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d
153,486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). See also Marusa v. District of Columbia,
484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532
P.2d 975 (1975); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d
550 (1964); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965). But see
Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
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A Matter of Semantics

Summary judgment against the plaintiff is guaranteed when
his complaint alleges ordinary negligence on the part of a liquor
vendor. A complaint using reckless misconduct principles, how
ever, probably will survive summary judgment. Calling conduct
reckless will get the case to a jury.
Under an ordinary negligence standard84 the sale of liquor is
the proximate cause of third-party injury when two elements are
present: An intoxicated vendee consumes liquor and his negligent
conduct is a foreseeable intervening cause. 85 Under a reckless mis
conduct standard the vendee's potential for injurious conduct
would have to be sufficiently apparent to the bartender to consti
tute a warning. 86 In both ordinary negligence and reckless miscon
duct cases the conduct of the liquor vendor and of the customer is
the same, only the language used to describe it is different. An or
dinary negligence complaint would fail because proximate cause
could not be established, but a reckless misconduct complaint
would succeed because proximate cause would be established by
public policy.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's newly created reckless and
wanton misconduct cause of action probably will expand. The court
may decide to adopt the reasoning of neighboring jurisdictions and
create an ordinary negligence action. If it does not, actions con
stituting ordinary negligence could be manipulated to conform to
the requirements of reckless and wanton misconduct. Notwithstand
ing these two possibilities, expanded liability could emerge if the
existing reckless misconduct action adopts disregard of imminent
danger as the equivalent of a constructive warning. Regardless of
which form the expansion takes, liquor vendors will face conflicting
duties.
V.

POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICTING DUTIES

In Merhi v. Becker87 plaintiff attended an outdoor picnic spon
sored by defendant, a local union. Becker, a union member, was
involved in two fights, one described as a brawl, but he was not
asked to leave. 88 A half hour after the brawl Becker drove his car
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See notes 71-79 supra and accompanying text.
W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 44, at 272.
See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
164 Conn. 516, 518, 325 A.2d 270, 272 (1973).
[d. at 518,325 A.2d at 272.
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into the picnic area and injured plaintiff, who had paid the one dol
lar admission price.
The court characterized plaintiff, a paying guest, as an
invitee. 89 Defendant, as "possessor of the premises . . . , had the
duty of exercising reasonable care and control to protect its invitees
from dangers which might reasonably be anticipated to arise from
the conditions of the premises or the activities taking place
there. "90 Defendant was found liable for failure to perform its duty
to control its "beer drinking guests. "91
Had defendant invitee in Merhi left the picnic and driven on
the public highway, the duty of the local union to control its
liquor-drinking guest would have ceased. As a result of Kowal, de
fendant local union would have to be proved r~ckless in its conduct
to be liable to an injured highway plaintiff but only negligent in its
conduct to be liable to an invitee. 92 The highway plaintiff, how
ever, seems to be as foreseeable a victim as an invitee plaintiff.
In Merhi the test of proximate cause was whether the harm
which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable
risk created by defendant's negligence. 93 The duty arose in de
fendant local union because it should reasonably have anticipated
. that dangers to invitees would arise from the amount of alcohol
consumed at the picnic. 94 The liquor-drinking invitees, however,
are just as dangerous to highway travelers. Certainly, the possibil
ity that an intoxicated picnicker will cause an accident while driv
ing on a public road is just as foreseeable as the possibility that he
will deliberately strike a fellow picnicker with his car. According to
current Connecticut law, defendant local union, or any liquor
vendor,95 could successfully defend a negligence suit brought by an
89. ld. at 519, 325 A.2d at 272.
90. ld. at 520, 325 A.2d at 272. The court does not discuss whether the duty to
control includes the duty to control the amount the invitee can consume.
91. ld.
92. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 61, at 392-93.
93. 164 Conn. at 521, 325 A.2d at 273. Defendant local union argued that be
cause defendant invitee's conduct was intentional it should have operated as an inde
pendent supervening cause. The court rejected the argument stating, "[T]he fact that
the [defendant] neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm, or
the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable." ld. at 521,
325 A.2d at 273. The court concluded that failure to police a large, liquor-drinking
crowd could result in boisterous and angry occurrences which might result in injury
to bystanders. ld. at 519, 325 A.2d at 273.
94. ld. at 519-20, 325 A.2d at 272.
95. A liquor vendor would have the same status as possessor of the premises
that the local union had in the Merhi case. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 57, at 351.
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injured highway traveler. If an objective foreseeability test9 6 be
comes the standard for reckless misconduct actions, however, lia
bility may be premised on a constructive warning, and the liquor
vendor could be faced with a dilemma. If the liquor vendor cannot
control the actions of an intoxicated invitee, he has a duty to expel
the invitee97 in spite of potential liability for reckless and wanton
misconduct. If the expelled customer causes third-party injury on
the highway, the liquor vendor could be liable for reckless and
wanton misconduct. The constructive warning will be present if the
harm was imminent, as required by Ziman and Nally, and disre
gard of the warning will be evidence of recklessness.
Measuring the duty owed by liquor vendors to the general
public is difficult in Connecticut because the common law has not
kept pace with the changes in society. Increased use of the auto
mobile and a marked rise in alcohol consumption have rendered
the common law surrounding dram shops inappropriate. In Kowal
the Connecticut Supreme Court attempted to address the problem,
but the court seems to have raised more questions than it has an
swered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Kowal, plaintiff's son was killed by Delbert Goff, a drunk
driver. Plaintiff sued the liquor vendor, who allegedly had contin
ued to serve Goff even though Goff was intoxicated. The suit was
brought in three counts, the first under the Connecticut Dram
Shop Act. The trial judge struck the second and third counts be
cause he believed that ordinary negligence and reckless misconduct
were precluded by the statutory remedy. On appeal, the Connec
ticut Supreme Court ruled that a cause of action for reckless and
wanton misconduct should have been recognized although the ordi
nary negligence action did not exist. In the face of contradictory
precedent, the court for the first time recognized a common-law
cause of action by third parties against liquor vendors.
Historically, ordinary negligence actions were disallowed be
cause causation could not be proved. The consumption of alcohol,
rather than the sale, was considered to be the proximate cause of
injury. This approach insulated liquor vendors from liability. In or
der to provide injured third parties with a remedy, as well as to
preserve a defense for liquor vendors in negligence suits, the
96.
97.

See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
164 Conn. at 520, 325 A.2d at 272.
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Connecticut Supreme Court decided in Kowal that public policy
will satisfy the causation element only when the conduct of liquor
vendors is reckless and wariton. The court, however, appears to be
ready to expand the common-law liability of liquor vendors even
further to include ordinary negligence liability.
Connecticut liquor vendors already may face expanded liability
since negligence complaints could easily be disguised as reckless
misconduct actions. Plaintiffs' attorneys undoubtedly will attempt
to get their cases to the jury by calling conduct reckless and wan
ton rather than negligent. The defense of lack of causation would
then be unavailable to the liquor vendor because policy considera
tions satisfy the proximate cause requirement in the reckless and
wanton misconduct action.
The Kowal court did not define "reckless and wanton miscon
duct." In prior cases not involving liquor vendors, however, the
court applied an objective standard to test for reckless and wanton
misconduct. Ziman,98 a Connecticut case, and Nally, 99 a Kentucky
case cited in Kowal, indicate that an objective foreseeability
standard will emerge as the measure of the liquor vendor's duty to
the general public.
'
Disregard of an express warning is evidence of reckless and
wanton misconduct. If a bartender is warned that a customer can
not control his drinking, a disregard of that warning will expose
him to liability under Kowal. The presence of a foreseeable danger
putting the defendant on constructive notice also might become a
ground for liability. Once a foreseeable danger becomes apparent,
the reckless actor would be charged with knowledge of that danger
just as he would be after receiving an actual warning.
Even if the new tort action does not expand to embrace ordi
nary negligence actions, the duties presented by Kowal and
Merhi 100 appear to be incongruous. These two cases place liquor
vendors in a dilemma: the liquor vendor must satisfy his duty to
protect business invitees from intoxicated customers at the expense
of the motoring public. A reevaluation of the Connecticut law ad
dressing the duties of liquor vendors is inevitable.
Joseph A. Hanofee
98. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text.

